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Highlights 
 Bayesian interpretation of single discrete class characteristics is explored. 
 Posterior odds ratios favourable to the prosecution cannot be attained. 
 This can be overcome by analysing more than one class characteristic. 
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Bayesian interpretation of forensic evidence has become dominated by the likelihood ratio (LR) with 
a large LR generally considered favourable to the prosecution hypothesis, HP, over the defence 
hypothesis, HD.  However, the LR simply quantifies by how much the prior odds ratio of the 
probability of HP relative to HD has been improved by the forensic evidence to provide a posterior 
ratio.  Because the prior ratio is mostly neglected, the posterior ratio is largely unknown, regardless 
of the LR used to improve it.  In fact, we show that the posterior ratio will only favour HD when LR 
is at least as large as the number of things that could possibly be the source of that evidence, all being 
equally able to contribute.  This restriction severely limits the value of evidence to the prosecution 
when only a single, discrete class characteristic is used to match a subset of these things to the 
evidence.  The limitation can be overcome by examining more than one individual characteristic, as 
long as they are independent of each other, as they are for the genotypes at multiple loci combined 
for DNA evidence.  We present a criterion for determining how many such characteristics are 
required.  Finally, we conclude that a frequentist interpretation is inappropriate as a measure of the 
strength of forensic evidence precisely because it only estimates the denominator of the LR. 
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This manuscript demonstrates a limitation of the forensic interpretation of discrete class 
characteristics which is only apparent from a Bayesian interpretation.  As such, it demonstrates the 
weakness of a frequentist interpretation, as well as providing guidance for the minimum requirements 





Bayes theorem is used to measure the relative strengths of two mutually exclusive hypotheses as a 
result of evidence presented to the court [1-6].  These are generally the prosecution and defence 
hypotheses (HP and HD, respectively).  The prosecution hypothesis often asserts that someone or 
something (a tool, a weapon, a car, for example) is the source of evidence found at a crime scene.  
The corresponding defence hypothesis asserts that this person or thing is not the source of the 
evidence.  A Bayesian interpretation of these two competing hypotheses involves adjusting belief in 
their relative truths based on observing how often there have been instances that support them, or as 
Richard Price noted in the forward to the posthumous publication of Bayes theorem [7]: 
 
Common sense is indeed sufficient to show us that, from the observation of what has in former 
instances been the consequence of a certain cause or action, one may make a judgement what is 
likely to be the consequence of it another time and that the larger number of experiments we have to 
support a conclusion, so much more the reason we have to take it for granted. 
 
It is illustrative to demonstrate the concept using the analogy of a deck of cards.  The individual cards 
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possibly be the source of the evidence.  The cards have class characteristics that define a subset of 
the complete deck.  For example, spades constitute one quarter (13/52) of the deck (neglecting jokers) 
and aces constitute one thirteenth (4/52) of the deck.  Hence knowing a class characteristic of a card 
narrows the pool of possible cards.  This has a direct forensic analogy in that, for example, knowing 
the blood group type of an evidentiary blood sample narrows the pool of potential donors and knowing 
the colour of a paint chip narrows the pool of potential cars it could be derived from. 
 
Let us then consider a card randomly drawn from a deck.  The probability that this card is a spade (S) 









The probability that the card is not a spade (the alternative hypothesis) is given by: 
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If P(AS) is the prior or original probability that the card is an ace of spades, then we can update this 










Hence we have a higher probability that the card is an ace of spades (and a lower probability that it 
is not) given that we know it is a spade.  If we know that the card is an ace, we can further increase 










This situation is analogous to having a better forensic test.  For example, we can achieve higher 
discrimination between people (further narrow the potential donors) if we use DNA profiling rather 
than blood group typing. 
 
For our card analogy, Bayes theorem tells us that: 
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This is the form of the familiar expression for Bayesian inference in a forensic setting [8] where 
evidence, E, is presented to the court and HP and HD are mutually exclusive hypotheses, ie. P(HP) = 

























 LR  
 
The likelihood ratio (LR) or “Bayes factor” [9-11] is the ratio of the probabilities of observing the 
evidence given the prosecution and defence hypotheses.  In our card analogy, the LR is dependent on 
the class characteristic known about the questioned card: the suit (spade, club, diamond or heart) or 
the rank (A, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, J, Q, K).  We develop this analogy to demonstrate the limited 
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Continuing our card analogy, the LR is the ratio of the probabilities of observing a spade (or an ace) 
given the alternate hypotheses that the card is or is not the ace of spades.  In the case that we know 


































 .  
 
It is 4.25 times more likely that the card is a spade under the hypothesis that it is the ace of spades 
than under the hypothesis that it is not the ace of spades.  Note that we cannot say that it is 4.25 times 
more likely than not that the card is an ace of spades given that is a spade.  It is in fact 12 times less 
likely.  But this is still an improvement on the prior ratio (1/51).  For the same reason, we cannot say 
in court that the prosecution hypothesis is LR times more likely than the defence hypothesis given 
the evidence.  This is the well documented fallacy of the transposed conditional or “prosecutor’s 
fallacy” [5, 12, 13]. We can only say that the evidence is LR times more likely under the prosecution 
hypothesis than under the defence hypothesis. 
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Both the LR and hence the posterior ratio have increased because our new class characteristic (rank 
= ace) is more discriminating than our old one (suit = spade).  However, the posterior ratio is still less 
than one.  In other words, it is still less likely that the unknown card is an ace of spades than it is not 
an ace of spades, in spite of a significantly larger LR.  However, in a forensic setting, it is the posterior 
ratio that is of ultimate interest to the court.  The problem is that it is never reported because the prior 






Let N be the total number of things (people, tools, weapons, cars, etc) equally capable of being the 
source of crime scene evidence.  Let n be the number of things (a subset of N) that have the same 
class characteristic as the evidence.  We assume that each of the things is equally likely to have 
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The probability of observing the evidence given the prosecution hypothesis is: 
 
  1PE|HP  
 
The probability of observing another thing with the same class characteristic as that observed in the 










E|HP D  
 











































Hence, the prior ratio is 1/(N - 1), the LR is (N - 1)/(n - 1) and the posterior ratio is always 1/(n - 1).  
Table 1 demonstrates that the posterior ratio will only favour the prosecution hypothesis when n < 2.  
In other words, of all the possible things that could be the source of the evidence (numbering N), if 
any more than one of them have ever been observed to have the same discrete class characteristic as 
the evidence, the posterior ratio will never be more than one.  For our card analogy, the probability 
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unless we know the card is an ace of spades.  This means that, in order to produce a posterior ratio 
favourable to the prosecution in court, the frequency of the discrete class characteristic, f, must be 
























This relationship is shown in Figure 1 where it can be seen that the posterior ratio favours the 
prosecution hypothesis (is greater than one) for small N and large LR and, conversely, favours the 
defence hypothesis (is less than one) for large N and small LR.  The posterior ratio is infinitely large 
(solely favours the prosecution hypothesis) for N = 1 as, in this case, there is only one possible person 
or thing that could be the source of the evidence. 
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 and 1LR  N  
 
Hence the LR must be at least as large as the number of things that could possibly have been the 
source of the evidence, N.  For our card analogy, we would need LR > 51 for the posterior ratio to 
favour drawing an ace of spades and this would only be the case if we knew the card was an ace of 
spades. 
 
Given that a single class characteristic will never produce a posterior ratio favourable to the 
prosecution for n > 1, we need to know how many independent class characteristics are required to 
provide a posterior ratio favourable for the prosecution under these conditions.  Let the number of 
things with the same class characteristics be n1, n2, n3, …, nk, where each of the k characteristics is 















321   
where fi is the frequency of the ith class characteristic. Taking the logarithm base 2 of both sides (for 
convenience): 
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 ...lnlnln1 3222122  
We now have a criterion for determining how many individual class characteristics are required to 
produce a posterior ratio favourable for the prosecution if we know the frequencies of those class 
characteristics and the number of things that could equally have been the source of the evidence.  So, 
for example, consider a paint chip that could equally have been derived from 1000 cars.  It has a 




01.0ln1 2  
As we have already demonstrated, a single class criterion is insufficient to produce a posterior ratio 
greater than one.  We therefore need another one.  Let’s assume that the paint chip has a solvent 





05.0ln01.0ln1 22  
We have achieved our criterion and the combination of these two independent class characteristics 
will produce a posterior ratio favourable to the prosecution.  Adding a third class characteristic will 
















































































For large N: 
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So, for example, consider again the paint chip with colour (pink) that is present in 1 % of 1000 cars 





























This posterior ratio is favourable to the defence, not the prosecution.  There are nine other cars that 
could have been the source of the paint chip.  Consider again the solvent residue that is present in 5 





























We often have to make conservatively large estimations of N because we don’t know how many 
things could have possibly been the source of the evidence.  For example, we may need to include all 
the people or cars or weapons in a country or in the world as possible sources.  Under these types of 
assumptions, f < 2/N is rarely the case and so the posterior probability is unlikely to favour the 
prosecution if a single discrete class characteristic is analysed. 
 
We can circumvent this problem by analysing more than one independent class characteristic.  This 
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(genotypes at multiple loci) are compared with frequencies of the same characteristics in the general 
population.  Population allele frequencies are used to infer genotype frequencies at multiple, 
independent loci such that the individual genotype frequencies at each locus can be multiplied 
together to produce overall genotype frequencies that are much less than 2/N (the so called product 
rule) [14].  However, this same principle should also be applied to other forms of evidence.  It is 
unlikely that determining the frequency of pink cars is going to provide a posterior ratio favourable 
to the prosecution in a case where the evidence consists of a pink paint chip, no matter how low the 
frequency (and thus, how high the LR).  This is because we need only observe more than one pink 
car to make the frequency 2/N or greater.  We need to analyse a further independent (of colour) class 
characteristic in order to be able to reduce the combined frequency.  This may be the presence of a 
particular mineral or solvent in the paint (but not pigment, as this is likely to contribute to colour). 
 
We have developed a criterion for the number of independent class characteristics required to produce 
evidence favourable to the prosecution (ie. to produce a posterior ratio greater than one.  For N things 
equally likely to have been the source of evidence and k independent characteristics of those things 
with frequencies f1, f2, f3, …, fk, a posterior ratio greater than one will result when: 
21−ln2𝑓1−ln2𝑓2−ln2𝑓3−...−ln2𝑓𝑘 > 𝑁 









This is a result familiar to forensic biologists who apply the product rule for genotype frequencies at 
different (independent) DNA loci and assume that there are N individuals who are equally likely to 
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It is easy to be seduced by large LRs.  Modern short tandem repeat (STR) DNA profiling kits produce 
LRs greater than 1020 for matching DNA profiles.  This is only meaningful, however, if we can 
estimate the prior probability that a random member of the population was the DNA donor [15].  This 
requires knowledge of the number of people that could possibly have had access to a crime scene at 
a particular time (N).  If we do not know this then we must necessarily conservatively overestimate 
N as, for example, the number of people in the region, country or, most conservatively, the world.  It 
is at least conceivable that anyone in the modern world could travel to the crime scene, deposit their 
DNA and then travel away again.  At the time of writing, the world population was estimated at 7.4 


























This posterior ratio still represents very strong evidence for the prosecution but consider a partial 
DNA profile with LR = 108.  At first glance, this would still seem strong evidence for the prosecution 


















Hence, conservatively, the defence hypothesis is 100 times more likely given this partial profile 
match.  While LRs of these magnitudes are common for DNA evidence, they are rare (or absent) for 
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A frequentist interpretation of forensic evidence only accounts for the denominator in the LR and 
takes no account of the prior and thus the posterior probability ratios.  The frequentist only considers 
the blue line in Figure 1 and not the red line but it is the posterior ratio relative to the red line that is 
the concern of the court.  Because we have shown that large LRs do not necessarily favour HP, the 
frequentist approach alone is inadequate as a measure of the strength of forensic evidence. 
 
Put another way, the frequentist approach to evidential value considers only the rarity of the class 
characteristic, which is associated with only one (of two) hypotheses in the adversarial legal system.  
It does not consider the rarity of the other (competing) hypothesis.  In our card example, when 
determining the probability that an unknown card is an ace of spades, a frequentist would only 
consider the rarity of a spade or an ace, and not the probability that the card is NOT the ace of spades.  
We showed that while this leads to an LR greater than one, the posterior odds remain less than one 
(and thus favour the hypothesis that the card is NOT the ace of spades).  This neglect was evident in 
the case of Sally Clark [16] who was wrongfully convicted (and later acquitted) of murdering her two 
sons.  The prosecution case relied on a significantly flawed frequentist interpretation presented by 
paediatrician Professor Sir Roy Meadow who calculated the rarity of sudden infant death syndrome 
(SIDS).  It was heavily criticised by the Royal Statistical Society [17] on the grounds that, while 
double SIDS is very rare, double infant murder is likely to be rarer still, so the probability of Clark's 
innocence was actually quite high: 
 
“Two deaths by SIDS or two murders are each quite unlikely, but one has apparently happened in 
this case. What matters is the relative likelihood of the deaths under each explanation, not just how 
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Further, Professor of Mathematics Ray Hill opined [18]: 
 
“When a cot death mother is accused of murder, the prosecution sometimes employs a tactic such as 
the following. If the parents are affluent, in a stable relationship and non-smoking, the prosecution 
will claim that the chances of the death being natural are greatly reduced, and by implication that the 
chances of the death being homicide are greatly increased. But this implication is totally false, because 








A frequentist interpretation of the strength of forensic evidence will always underestimate support for 
the defence hypothesis that a random thing (person, tool, weapon, car, etc) could have been the source 
of forensic evidence.  This is particularly the case when only one discrete class characteristic of the 
evidence is considered (eg. colour of a paint chip, type of footwear impression, presence or absence 
of a single chemical component).  It is only required to demonstrate the occurrence of one other thing 
with this property in a reference collection (or, indeed, perhaps, in the world) for the Bayesian 
posterior odds ratio to favour the defence hypothesis. 
 
The only way to circumvent this problem is to analyse more than one independent class characteristic 











Bayesian interpretation of discrete class characteristics 
 
Page 18 of 24 
 
greater than the number of things observed, all things being equally likely to be the source of the 
evidence).  This has been successfully achieved in forensic genetics by the use of the so-called product 
rule where the frequencies of genotypes at loci sufficiently separated in the genome as to be 
independently inherited can be combined as independent events, thus producing LRs far in excess of 
the number of people in the world.  This approach may be appropriate for other fields.  For example, 
if it can be demonstrated that fingerprint patterns are independent of ridge characteristics, then the 
frequencies of patterns and ridge characteristics in reference populations could be combined to 
similarly produce LRs in excess of the number of people possibly able to have contributed the 
fingerprint (conservatively, the number of people in the world). 
 
Finally, the frequent inability to estimate the prior odds ratio warrants one or both of the following to 
be applied to Bayesian evidence interpretation: 
(a) The worst case scenario for the prosecution, ceding all reasonable uncertainty to the defence, 
should be used to estimate the prior odds ratio.  This is consistent with the common judicial 
prerogative to minimise wrongful convictions (at the expense of wrongful acquittals) 
(b) Prosecution on the basis of a single piece of evidence using a single, discrete class characteristic 
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Figure 1 Posterior ratio as a function of both the likelihood ration (LR) and the number of things that could 
possibly be the source of the evidence (N), represented with linear (top) and logarithmic (bottom) 
scales.  The red line represents a situation where neither the prosecution or defence hypotheses are 
favoured given the evidence (posterior ratio = 1 or log posterior ratio = 0) and the blue line 
represents a situation where the evidence is no more likely under either the prosecution or defence 
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Table 1 Posterior ratio of probabilities as a function of the number of things (n) that have the same 
discrete class characteristic 
n 
 
 |EHP
|EHP
D
P  
1 ∞ 
2 1 
3 1/2 
4 1/3 
5 1/4 
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